Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967)

Source: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

URL: https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/1967/352-mass-544-2.html

Citation: 226 N.E.2d 556, 352 Mass. 544, 1967 Mass. LEXIS 845

Date: May 16, 1967

Court Information

Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk

Judges: Wilkins, C.J., Whittemore, Cutter, Spiegel, & Reardon, JJ.

Argued: March 6, 1967

Decided: May 16, 1967

Counsel:

Case Background

The defendant, McHoul, was convicted and sentenced for two crimes committed about 2 P.M. on March 29, 1966 — assault with intent to rape, and breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit rape. The defendant at the time was a patient at Boston State Hospital. About 2:25 P.M. on March 29, the defendant said to a male practical nurse at the hospital, who asked where his trousers were, "I want to tell you something. I did something wrong. I raped a woman."

Issues on Appeal

The issues on this appeal relate to the defence of insanity.

Opinion

1. Expert Testimony Error

An expert for the Commonwealth, Dr. Malcolm Rosenblatt, testified that he had an opinion as to the sanity of the defendant which was, "That according to the M'Naghten rule he was legally sane." The defendant moved to have the answer struck. The judge ruled, "I will strike out the part about the M'Naghten rule. I will allow the last part to stand." The defendant excepted "to the part of the answer the Court did not strike."

The court held that this was prejudicially erroneous. The witness did not testify that in his view, McHoul, according to Massachusetts law, was sane. He did not testify in respect of irresistible impulse. The judge's ruling left before the jury a statement, attributable to a qualified physician, not in fact made by him. It presented to the jury, in terms conclusive of the issue that they alone were to pass on, an unsupported statement.

2. Refusal to Charge Under Model Penal Code

The defendant excepted to the refusal of the judge to charge in the words of § 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962) p. 66:

"Section 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility. (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."

The Massachusetts Rule (Rogers Case)

The rule which has prevailed in Massachusetts was first expressed by Shaw, C.J., in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 501-502. A more recent statement, including a quotation from the Rogers case, is in Commonwealth v. McCann, 325 Mass. 510, 515:

"One whose mental condition is such that he cannot distinguish between right and wrong is not responsible for his conduct, and neither is one who has the capacity to discriminate between right and wrong but whose mind is in such a diseased condition that his reason, conscience and judgment are overwhelmed by the disease and render him incapable of resisting and controlling an impulse which leads to the commission of a homicide. In such an instance, the homicide would be 'not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it.'"

The Court's Analysis

The court regarded the Code definition as an evolutionary restatement of the Massachusetts rule rather than a substantively new rule. The Code's expression of the dual test modifies the classical Rogers case wording in three significant respects:

1. The qualification of "capacity" ("substantial capacity")

2. The use of the word "appreciate" rather than "know"

3. The rejection of the words "irresistible impulse" in stating lack of capacity to control conduct

Jury Instructions Error

The judge charged the jury substantially in terms of the M'Naghten rule, saying:

"[E]very man is presumed to be sane ... until the contrary be proved to your satisfaction. To establish a defense upon the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of the act the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did ... [know], that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."

He then added:

"An irresistible impulse to commit a crime in and of itself is no defense to its commission unless it is accompanied by an inability to distinguish between right and wrong and ... [a lack of] awareness of the nature and quality of the acts committed at the time of their commission."

The court held this instruction wrongly stated that the absence of awareness of wrongdoing must accompany irresistible impulse. The court rejected the Commonwealth's suggestion that the defect in the charge may be overlooked because the evidence did not show conduct that was irresistibly impelled.

3. Adoption of Model Penal Code Standard

The court held that the rule stated in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Section 4.01, as to when mental disease or defect excludes criminal responsibility is a restatement of the Massachusetts rule on that subject in modern terms and in clearer and more understandable words.

The court ordered that hereafter in criminal cases in which the defence of insanity is in issue the trial shall be conducted and the charge given in accordance with the Code rule.

Expert Testimony in This Case

Dr. Robey, the clinical director of the Bridgewater State Hospital for the Criminally Insane, called by the defendant, had seen McHoul ten to fifteen or more times. On March 29, 1966:

Holdings

1. It was prejudicial error for the judge to strike out the part of the expert's statement "about the M'Naghten rule" and to allow the "last part" to stand

2. The judge's instruction that irresistible impulse was no defence unless accompanied by an inability to distinguish between right and wrong was wrong

3. The Model Penal Code § 4.01 standard is adopted as the Massachusetts rule on criminal responsibility

4. Judgments reversed. Verdicts set aside.

Significance

This case established the modern standard for the insanity defense in Massachusetts, adopting the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code test. The McHoul standard requires that:

This replaced the older M'Naghten rule that had been previously used in Massachusetts.